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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER PRESTON BOGGESS, JR., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16894 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The respondent, Walter P. Boggess, Jr., responds to the 
state's appeal from the trial court's order granting a writ of 
habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus was based on trial 
counsel's failure to file a timely appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District, the Honorable David K. Winder 
presiding, ordered that if this Court did not take jurisdiction 
of respondent's out-of-time appeal by January 6, 1980, he was to 
be released and his conviction of manslaughter set aside on that 
date. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order affirming the trial court's 
order which granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, and 
- 1 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he argues that this Court should decline to invoke jurisdictior1 
to hear an out-of-time appeal as previously ruled. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent, Walter Boggess, was tried on May 18, 1978 
for second degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-2 
(1953 as amended), before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock of th 
Fourth Judicial District. Respondent was represented at trial . 
by court appointed counsel, George Mangan. Counsel for respon-
dent pursued the lesser included offense of manslaughter as 
theory at trial. Respondent was convicted of manslaughter on 
May 19, 1978. Respondent was desirous of an appeal of his case 
-and he made verbal and written demands on his appointed counsel 
to perfect an appeal on his behalf. Mangan did not file a 
timely Notice of Appeal. 
On November 30, 1978, the Honorable Ernest Baldwin, one 
of the Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, received evidence at an evidentiary 
hearing on respondent's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that 
proved the following facts: that respondent did contact Mangan 
before time for filing Notice of Appeal had run and demanded an 
appeal on his behalf be filed; that respondent did mail a lette 
to Mangan on or about July 10, 1978, demanding that an appeal o 
his behalf be filed; that Mangan did receive the foregoing 
letter on or about July 18, 1978, within time to file timely 
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Notice of Appeal for respondent; that Mangan did understand and 
know that respondent wanted an appeal; that Mangan at the time 
of receipt of the letter from respondent on July 18, 1978, knew 
timely appeal could still be perfected; and that Mangan failed 
to file a timely Notice of Appeal on behalf of respondent. 
Following the evidentiary hearing in which testimony, 
evidence and argument was heard, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr., ruled that the respondent had been denied his right to an 
appeal and his right to counsel under the Fourteenth and Sixth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court entered 
the following order by stipulation of counsel for petitioner 
and the State of Utah: he granted respondent permission to 
file an out-of-time appeal; and in the event the Supreme Court 
declined to invoke jurisdiction he directed respondent return 
to the ordering court for appropriate relief. 
On October 16, 1979, this Court refused to invoke 
jurisdiction for an appeal based on Utah Code Annotated §77-39-5 
(1953 as amended). State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979). 
Respondent's counsel, though having been demanded to do so, 
failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal. 
On December 6, 1979, the Honorable David K. Winder 
ordered that if the Supreme Court did not take jurisdiction 
of the substantive merits of the appeal by respondent within 
thirty (30) days, respondent's Petition for a Writ of Habeas 
- 3 -
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corpus would be granted. On January 6, 1980, the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus was granted, and respondent was released from 
prison and his conviction was set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AUTHORITY AUTHORIZING THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO EXERCISE ITS APPELLATE 
POWER IS JURISDICTIONAL. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-39-5 (1953 as amended) provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
All appeals in criminal cases must 
be taken within one month after the 
entry of judgment appealed from. 
The strict adherence to the jurisdictional aspect of tht 
appellate power has been discussed and confirmed in numerous 
cases. The strict adherence to the prescribed time requirement 
was construed in Sullivan v. District Court of Summit County, 
65 Utah 400, 237 P. 516 (1925). Following the learning from 
Sullivan, ibid., the Utah Supreme Court, not unlike other 
appellate tribunals operating under similar jurisdictional di-
rectives, have jealously preserved the integrity of the juris-
dictional requirement to refuse to hear appellate matters not 
timely filed even though pressured by other courts to make dis-
cretionary exceptions. The Utah Supreme Court declined the 
out-of-time appeal of the respondent in the instant case for 
failing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court timely, State v. 
Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979). Prior in time, this court 
- 4 -
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refused to succumb to the pressure directed by the U.S. 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals which sought and directed that the 
Utah Supreme Court should hear an out-of-time appeal. See 
Rahowie v. Smith, F. 2d ( 19 ) . 
POINT II 
GRANTING APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, AT THIS TIME, FOR ERRORS 
ARISING FROM THE INITIAL TRIAL PROCEED-
INGS IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has previously 
considered all the issues of jurisdiction on appeal in the 
instant case, State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979). 
The Court refused to take jurisdiction of the appeal based on 
the Utah Code Annotated §77-39-5 (1953 as amended). 
The Court, in the cited case, found that the Notice 
of Appeal was not timely filed as prescribed to the foregoing 
statute and therefore ruled it was precluded from addressing the 
merits of the respondent's contentions. 
Furthermore, the Court in State v. Boggess, ibid., 
went to say that: 
• . • A habeas corpus proceeding can 
neither be used as a substitute for an 
appeal nor can it extend that statutory 
time allotted for filing an appeal. 
In support of the foregoing proposition the Court cited 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), Bryant v. 
Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967). 
- 5 -
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consistent with the foregoing case law, counsel for 
appellant generally contends that a Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal. 
Nevertheless, in the case at bar, counsel for appellant urges 
otherwise. A position contrary to his often cited case law. 
POINT III 
THE RELEASE OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE 
SETTING ASIDE OF HIS CONVICTION IS THE 
PROPER REMEDY. 
Respondent's court appointed counsel had an obligation 
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 {1967) to per-
feet an appeal on behalf of respondent. 
Furthermore, as was pointed out in the brief submitted 
by counsel for the appellant, in the event the appointed counse 
believes the appeal was wholly frivolous, counsel still has the 
duty to his client and the Court to preserve and protect the 
client's constitutional rights of appeal--a right that is funda 
mental and one that must be protected to insure due process 
and in equal protection of the law. 
At the evidentiary hearing on Respondent's Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court did not find evidence that 
court appointed counsel for respondent complied with the requirj 
ments of his duty to his client as directed by Anders v. 
California, ibid. Judge Baldwin specifically found respondent': 
fundamental right of appeal had been denied. 
- 6 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court, following the majority case law, ordered that 
the parties attempt to have the Supreme Court invoke its appel-
late jurisdiction to grant respondent an out-of-time appeal. 
Furthermore, in the event the Supreme Court declined to invoke 
jurisdiction, then the respondent could apply to that Court for 
further relief. 
The prevailing case law provides that in the event the 
infirmity cannot be cured, the alternative relief can only 
be release from custody and the setting aside of the convic-
tion. Nearly all of the following originated as State cases 
and proceeded into the Federal system by process of exhausting 
remedies of appeal on Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
proceedings. Kinsey v. Wainwright, 254 Fed. Sub. 30 (1965); 
Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (1965); Patterson v. Medberry, 
290 F.2d 275 (1961). The latter, a Tenth Circuit case, dealt 
with the denial of the State to provide a transcript for the 
purposes of appeal. The denial abrogated the defendant's 
right to appeal his conviction, and the Court in considering 
the appropriateness of release on balance with the inability 
to cure the infirmity in the appeal process, stated: 
. . . the problem of releasing one con-
victed murderer . • . our system or con-
stitutional guarantees of due process 
and equal protection both call for pro-
cedures in criminal trials which all 
allow no individuous discriminations 
between persons and different groups 
of persons . . . 
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The above court further saw the State as having a 
statutory remedy and stated: 
• retry the defendant, difficult 
but not insurmountable. 
In Coffman v. Bomar, 220 Fed. Sub 343 (1963), the defen 
dant requested that state officials appoint counsel for his app 
process. The defendant believing he was represented by ap-
pointed counsel was denied an appeal because no timely notice 
had been filed in his behalf. The State failed to appoint 
defendant counsel and failed to advise defendant of its in-
action. Time for the appeal had run. The Court found the 
only remedy was to release defendant from custody and set 
aside the conviction and allow the State to re-prosecute 
the defendant. The theory was to insure due pro.cess by 
putting the defendant in the same position he would have 
been should an appeal been granted. 
POINT IV 
THE STATE, IN THE INSTANT CASE, HAS 
STATUTORY REMEDY TO RE-PROSECUTE THE 
RESPONDENT. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-1-405 (1953 as amended) speci-
fically provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Subsequent prosecution not barred-
Circumstances. -A subsequent prosecution 
for an offense shall not be barred 
under the following circumstances: 
. . . (2) The former prosecution re-
sulted in a judgment of guilt held 
invalid in a subsequent proceeding on 
writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or 
similar collateral attack. 
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The legislative branch has limited the time for 
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by 
providing for filing of Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) 
days. Likewise, the legislature has provided the State 
authorities with a statutory authority to re-prosecute cases 
collaterally attacked by Writs of Habeas Corpus. The Legi-
slature has not granted any discretionary authority to the Court 
to modify the thirty (30) day limitation rule. In light of 
the prevailing case law and the theory of separation of powers, 
any such change or modification of the jurisdictional rule 
should be by legislative mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Third District Court granting 
respondent relief pursuant to his Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
releasing him from State custody, should be affirmed. The 
limitation on the time for appeal is jurisdictional and coun-
sel for respondent failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal. 
The power of the Supreme Court to now hear the merits of the 
defendant's contentions of errors at the time of trial, pre-
viously considered on direct appeal is now barred by Res 
Judicata. In addition, this Court simultaneously, in the 
same ruling, held this respondent could not use a Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a substitute for direct appeal. 
The respondent was effectively denied his right to 
appeal. The trial court in an evidentiary hearing found that 
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counsel for respondent failed to perfect the appeal as is 
required under Anders v. California, ibid., denying respondent 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
The prevailing case law provides for a cure of the 
infirmity in the denial of due process on appeal, and in the 
event the infirmity cannot be cured, then the respondent must 
be released and the conviction set aside. The State has a 
statutory remedy to re-prosecute the respondent. The contrived 
scheme of constructive notice argued by counsel for appellant 
is not sanctioned by statutory law or case law. Such a 
scheme could only properly be affected by appropriate legis-
lation directing such a procedure. 
Based on the foregoing, the Order granting respondent 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release and the setting 
aside of his conviction should be affirmed. 
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